Introduction
The recent mortgage default crisis follows an unprecedented period of home price appreciation. In this paper, I study the relationship between home price growth over the last decade and the share of loans made and held by lenders with a physical presence in the local market. I test whether local lenders are more likely than non-local lenders to exit markets when prices diverge from fundamentals. By examining lenders' behavior during the crisis, I am able to test if local lenders forecast the bust in housing prices and what role they play in the subsequent foreclosure crisis. My hypothesis is that local lenders understand when prices are out of line with fundamentals because they operate in the local economy. I find that during the run-up, local market share decreases most in areas that experience the worst price declines during the bust.
Historically the market share of local lenders is steadily decreasing over time. However, I find evidence that local lending is making a comeback. I define a loan to be Local if the lender that makes the loan has a branch in the county where the property is located. Figure 1 shows that from 1998-2006, the market share of local lenders decreases. Yet, during the crisis from 2008-09, the average Local Share increases to levels even higher than in 1998. If there is a return to localized lending it is important to understand what role local lenders play in an economy. 1 The theoretical literature about financial institutions suggests that banks should be large, diversified and financed mainly with debt in order to minimize risk and address asymmetric information issues. 2 Thus, local lenders must be providing a specific service 1 I also test the scenario in which I define loans made by non-depository originators that are associated with banks, such as CitiMortgage and Citibank, as local and the results are robust to the original definition of local. 2 Leland and Pyle (1977), Townsend (1979) and Diamond (1984) .
to warrant their existence. Previous literature documents how local lenders invest more in personal relationships and are able to take advantage of soft information. Both the size of the institution and the distance from borrowers have been suggested in prior literature as important factors in the institutions' willingness to loan to riskier borrowers and the bank's ability to retain borrowers' business. 3 The size of the bank plays a large role because of the difficulty to transmit soft information across multiple layers of a decision making process. Stein (2002) argues that small, decentralized banks have a comparative advantage in the case of small business lending because small banks can utilize soft information, i.e. information that cannot be directly verified by anyone other than the agent that produces it. Loan officers at small banks have the incentive to invest in information gathering because they have the power to allocate capital unlike loan officers that operate within large banks. Working for smaller banks not only gives the loan officers access to soft information but also enables them to put the information to good use. Petersen and Rajan (2002) argue that distance no longer deters financing because technological advances such as computers and communication equipment improve bank employees' productivity. Instead of loan officers using soft information, there is more hard information available about the borrower from a variety of sources. Plus, the response time is quicker, so even if the borrower defaults on a payment the lender can intervene quickly.
However, Degryse and Ongena (2005) find that loan rates decrease with the distance between the lender and the borrower to offset transportation costs. So, while distance may no longer be a factor in getting a loan, it still can affect the price of the loan. Also, my findings suggest that lenders with soft information about housing prices exited areas with the worst price declines, so in the case of housing prices, soft information led to a better understanding of the market than hard information.
Berger et. al. (2005) finds that large banks are less willing to lend to informationally difficult borrowers and lend at a greater distance. The authors also show that relationships last longer and are more exclusive between borrowers and small banks. They suggest this result makes sense because soft information produced over time is non-transferable. My measure allows both small and large banks to be classified as local as long as they have a branch in the county where they are making loans. I think this is important distinction because essentially I am quantifying local lending, not just local lenders. Borrowers can form bonds with branch employees regardless of the size of the bank.
Recent studies show that credit supply plays a major role in the housing crisis. 4 Over time, mortgage lending practices loosen and the average borrower's leverage increases, which subsequently leads to more borrowers defaulting on their loans. 5 Some areas experience an increase in mortgage originations even while relative income growth decreases.
If credit supply contributed to the housing crisis it is important to determine how certain lenders behaved during the run-up to the crisis. Lenders differ in their ability and willingness to invest in information gathering about the default risk of their borrowers. 6 Different lending strategies lead to a divergence among lenders in regards to how informed they are about their loan portfolio. 6 Rice and Strahan (2012); Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) Thus far, the literature has focused on soft information as it pertains to the borrowers.
I test whether local lenders are also informed about markets, specifically, the housing market. The housing mortgage default crisis provides a particularly dramatic setting to study the knowledge of local lenders. I then separate the local loans into loans that are sold by the lenders and loans the lender retains on its balance sheet to determine if local lenders are actively leaving the market. If the housing market is overheating, then fewer local loans will be held. It is in fact the case that the relationship is stronger; A 1 standard deviation increase in housing prices explains roughly 17% of the decrease in the share of local loans held. Prices also decline most where the share held by local lenders falls fastest. A 1 standard deviation increase in the share of local loans during the run-up is associated with a 1% increase in home price growth during the bust even controlling for the price run-up during the boom. On average, housing prices fall 15% from 2006-09. This suggests that local lenders understand when prices exceed the value of the home, and exit the market to safeguard their portfolios against future mortgage defaults. The change in the Local Share has a positive correlation of .75 with the change in the share of local loans held. This means that not only do local lenders originate less, but they also hold less of the loans in their portfolio. I argue that local lenders are actively exiting overheated markets.
I further examine the behavior of local lenders in different markets using the Saiz measurement of housing supply elasticity. Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz (2008) explain that prices in areas with an extremely elastic housing supply (i.e. unlimited ability to build and expand the housing stock such as Wichita, KS.) will not deviate from fundamentals.
In fact, home price growth in high elasticity markets during the pre-crisis years remains relatively flat, growing at the rate of inflation. Home price growth is more strongly negatively correlated with Local Share in areas with low housing elasticity, such as Miami, Finally, I introduce size into the analysis and define Small and Large lenders three different ways to study that dimension as well. I find that on average both small and large lenders behave similarly, no matter how I define the cut-off and while I cannot reject that they are behaving exactly the same way, it is clear that being local matters in addition to size. Small lenders avoid potentially over-heating markets and are able to forecast that prices will decrease in the future, and all but the largest lenders decrease their market share with home price appreciation during the Boom. I explore the relationship further for the largest lenders and find that while the Local Share of lenders with more than ten billion in assets in 2002 is not correlated with home price appreciation during the run-up, it is the case that the loans they originate and hold are negatively correlated while the loans which they distribute are positively correlated. This potentially explains why lenders with the ability to distribute loans may remain in a market while those that cannot distribute their loans to the same degree decrease their overall number of mortgage originations.
My results suggest that lenders with branches in the counties where they made their loans take time to understand more completely the borrower's probability of default as well as the true value of the home. Investing in information is beneficial for the lender because they lend to qualified borrowers and for the borrowers because they gain access to credit.
The relationship between local lending, house price behavior and foreclosure rates suggests that local lenders could play an important role in avoiding another housing crisis. The rest of the paper is as follows: section 2 describes the data and summary statistics, section 3 describes the empirical methods, section 4 details the results and section 5 concludes. 7 Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak (2009) find that foreclosure at a distance of 0.05 miles lowers the price of a house by about 1%.
Data and Summary Statistics
I test the relationship between mortgage loans, housing prices and foreclosure rates. In order to test these relationships I need data on loan originations, the location of the lender, loan retention rates, housing prices and foreclosure rates. I use branch locations to define if a lender is local and regress the share of local loans originated on housing prices during real estate run-up and crisis. I also test if localized lending is related to foreclosures rates during the crisis. Again, I consider a loan Local if the lender that makes the loan has a branch in the county where the property is located. I sum the number of local loans and scale that by the total number of loans originated to create an Local Share for each ZIP code. Figure 1 shows the average Local Share over time measured across ZIP codes. From 1998-2002 the average levels stay around 30%; during the run-up to the housing crisis the levels dip to as low as 21%. Eventually the average Local Share increases to 34%, which is higher than even the 1998 levels. Overall loan origination levels fall from 2006-09, yet the share made by local lenders increases. Table 1 details the annualized change in HMDA variables. I calculate the median of the log of income of the borrower, median income-to-loan ratios, and securitization rates.
HMDA data specifies if the lender sells the loan after origination. For both local and non-local loans, I sum the number of loans originated and held, and scale by the total number of loans originated, respectively. I do this to test if housing prices appreciation decreases further the share of local loans that the lender holds.
Zillow Data
Median home price data are available from the Zillow Home Value Index. Zillow.com provides monthly housing price data at the ZIP code level back to 1996. 9 By downloading the Zillow database from Zillow.com, my sample includes pricing data for: all homes, studios, condominiums, one-bed, two-bed, three-bed, four-bed and many-bed homes. Over time, the sample increases to include more ZIP codes. In 1999, there are roughly ten thousand ZIP codes covered by Zillow; by 2009, the amount covered increases to over twenty-five thousand. My sample includes all ZIP codes that can be identified and mapped into their corresponding counties using the Missouri Census Data Center geocodes. There are 1,155 ZIP codes in my sample for California during the housing boom which also have housing price data from Zillow. Table 3 shows foreclosure rates over time.
Throughout the housing boom, the foreclosure rate stays steady around 1 foreclosure for every one thousand housing units. During the housing crisis, mean rates reach as high as 22 foreclosures for every one thousand households.
Housing Supply Elasticity and Microeconomic Data
I use the Saiz housing supply elasticity measure based on satellite imagery of steep terrain and bodies of water to identify the amount of developable land in metropolitan areas (Saiz, 2010 ). An example of an area with a large amount of developable land, and thus a high elasticity value, is Wichita, KS. On the other end of the elasticity spectrum is Miami, FL.
The housing supply elasticity measure is only available for the largest MSA's, so my sample size decreases in 2002 from 8,643 ZIP codes to 3,928 ZIP codes when I include the elasticity measurement. I calculated the median elasticity and break my sample into "High" and "Low" elasticity, depending on whether the value is above or below the median. I run my analysis on these two sub-samples to illustrate the differences in areas where housing prices should not react to demand because the land is available to increase the housing supply.
Housing prices are strongly tied to economic factors. To proxy for health and prospects of the local economy, I use median income, unemployment and poverty growth rates measured at the county level in the year t. Growth rates are measured over the same time horizon as the housing price growth rates. Data on median income and poverty rates are from the U.S. Census Bureau Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE).
Data on the unemployment rates are from the Bureau of Labor local area unemployment statistics. 
Empirical Methods

Originate to Hold verse Originate to Distribute
After I establish the relationship between the Local Share and housing prices, I then divide both local loans and non-local loans into originated and held verse originated and 
Local lenders would only be interested in the borrower's ability to repay loans that are held, and housing price depreciation increases the borrower's probability of default. As in the case with the change in the Local Share, I rerun equation (2a) and (2b) on the subsample of ZIP codes that are covered by the Saiz housing supply elasticity measure to again tease out the correlation between the portion of the Local loans that are held and housing prices.
California Foreclosure Rates
To test the effects on defaults directly, I use the foreclosure rates for the state of California made available by the RAND California Statistics. I scale the total number of foreclosures Table 4 details the results of equation (1a) In Table 5 the sign of the coefficient changes when I regress house price growth during the Bust on the change in the Local Share during the Boom. Table 5 
Results
Originate to Hold verse Originate to Distribute
California Foreclosure Rates
California is representative of a rich subsample and accounts for nearly 20% of my sample Table 9 details the results for equation (3a) and (3c). Foreclosures are highly negatively correlated with home price growth, however, since borrowers tend not to default on their homes when the price is appreciating. Since the prices fall substantially over the Bust period, I include the housing price change along with the economic controls in equation (3b) and (3d). Table 11 shows the relationship between the growth rates of local and non-local lenders with housing prices. The market share of local lenders could mechanically be decreasing because more loans are originated in an area. In order to determine the reason for the decrease in the market share of local lenders I calculate growth rates of local and non-local lending. As with Local Share, the growth rate of local lenders is negatively correlated with housing price growth during the boom. Non-local lending is positively correlated. For a 1% increase in housing prices, local lending decreases by a little over two percent and non-local lending increases by roughly 2.5%. It may be the case that non-local lenders are entering markets with riskier borrowers because the poverty rate enters the regression as positive and statistically significant. These results show that local market share is not mechanically falling but rather local lenders are in fact reducing their lending regardless of non-local lenders' behavior.
Local and Non-Local Lending Growth Rates
I find that the growth in local lending also forecasts the bust. Table 12 
Size: Fifty Percent of Market Share in 2002
In order to explore the relationship between location and size I define size three different ways to cover the range of market share between small and large lenders. I cover the results for small and large lenders defined by asset size in the online appendix that accompanies this paper. the mortgage yet sell it within the year. Local Share perhaps because of the Lender's access to greater funds.
Conclusion
This is firstly an information story and I find evidence that lenders with a physical presence in the market are better informed about housing prices and are able to forecast that prices will fall during the bust. House prices during the crisis fall more in areas where the local share decreased during the run-up. It is possible that local lenders are trying to minimize their exposure to future foreclosures since borrowers with a mortgage loan greater than the value of the home are more likely to default. Branch level data, FDIC Summary of Deposits
• Local Loan= indicator equal to 1 if the lender has a branch in the county where the loan is to be made.
• • High elasticity = indicator equal to 1 is the value of the elasticity is above the median elasticity value, e.g., Wichita, KS.
• Low elasticity = indicator equal to 1 is the value of the elasticity is below the median elasticity value, e.g., Miami, FL.
Size Definitions
• Median Assets (covered in the online appendix)
-Small Lenders = lenders with less than the average median asset size of lenders from 2002-06: roughly below 200 million dollars.
• Market Share • Larges Lenders (covered in the online appendix)
-Small Lenders = lenders with less than than 10 billion dollars in assets in 2002.
Microeconomic Variables
• . The unit of observation is at the ZIP code level. Home Price Growth refers to median home prices from Zillow.com for all homes. The Local Share is the total number of local loans scaled by the total loans originated. Median income (log) is the log of the borrowers' median income. Loan to Income is the ratio of the amount of the loan to the borrower's income. High (e.g., Wichita, KS) and Low (e.g., Miami, FL) elasticity measure based on Saiz housing supply elasticity. Data on median income and poverty rates are from the U.S. Census Bureau Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE). Data on the unemployment rate are from the Bureau of Labor local area unemployment statistics. -2002 . The unit of observation is at the ZIP code level. Home Price Growth refers to median home prices from Zillow.com for all homes. The Local Share is the total number of local loans scaled by the total loans originated. Median income (log) is the log of the borrowers' median income. Loan to Income is the ratio of the amount of the loan to the borrower's income. High (e.g., Wichita, KS) and Low (e.g., Miami, FL) elasticity measure based on Saiz housing supply elasticity. Data on median income and poverty rates are from the U.S. Census Bureau Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE). Data on the unemployment rate are from the Bureau of Labor local area unemployment statistics.
(1) The unit of observation is at the ZIP code level. The Local Held Share is the number of local loans held by the lender, scaled by the total local loans. Home Price Growth refers to median home prices from Zillow.com for all homes. Median income (log) is the log of the borrowers' median income. Loan to Income is the ratio of the amount of the loan to the borrower's income. High (e.g., Wichita, KS) and Low (e.g., Miami, FL) elasticity measure based on Saiz housing supply elasticity. Data on median income and poverty rates are from the U.S. Census Bureau Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE). Data on the unemployment rate are from the Bureau of Labor local area unemployment statistics.
(1) (1) (1) . Small Lenders refers to lenders with less than half of the market share of mortgages in 2002. The unit of observation is at the ZIP code level. Foreclosure data are from the Californian Rand Business and Economic Statistics. Home Price Growth refers to median home prices from Zillow.com for all homes. The Local Share is the total number of local loans scaled by the total loans originated. The Local Held Share is the number of local loans held by the lender, scaled by the total local loans. Median income (log) is the log of the borrowers' median income. Loan to Income is the ratio of the amount of the loan to the borrower's income. Data on median income and poverty rates are from the U.S. Census Bureau Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE). Data on the unemployment rate are from the Bureau of Labor local area unemployment statistics. 
